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ENCOURAGING COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR:
MEMORIAL SLOAN-KETTERING’S MODEL BEHAVIOR
By A. Isabel Heine
INTRODUCTION
The concept of a moral hazard is a traditionally economic term that is defined as
“excessive expenditure due to eligibility for insurance benefits.”1 This economic term has found
its way into the health care world to mean the additional health care services or treatment that is
purchased by individuals once they become insured.2 For example, an insured individual may
spend an extra day in the hospital that is not necessary simply because he/she can due to their
insurance coverage.3 According to economists, the patient consumer’s view of the cost of that
extra day at the hospital is zero because their health insurance is paying for it.4 One can imagine
that this was not viewed favorably by the health insurance companies and this economic concept
has therefore created a trend towards higher co-payments and deductibles for patients.5 The
rationale behind these increases is that health care consumers will avoid imprudent and pricier
health care treatments or services if the co-payment up front is higher.6 This unfortunately has
unintended consequences. The uninsured and underinsured will tend to underuse and forego
essential health care services, which may then result in higher morbidity and an increase in
preventable hospitalizations and deaths.7
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Health insurance coverage in the United States has increased from 45 percent of the
population in 1960 to about 83 percent of the population in 2011.8 During that same 51-year
span, the percentage of United States Gross Domestic Product attributable to personal health care
rose from 4.4 percent to more than 15 percent.9 There is an undeniable relationship between the
number of insured Americans and rising health care spending.
But health insurance is not going anywhere and with the implementation of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) many more Americans will be insured than ever
before. There are cost-containment provisions related to copayments to help curb some of
individual health care consumer spending, but one thing that is not being controlled is the costs
of services and treatments in general.10 The concept of the moral hazard as related to health care
does not seem to be going anywhere either, so why not remove it? Comparative effectiveness
research (CER) has the potential to do this in a sense through its consideration of cost and
expansive evidentiary standards.

By removing a pricier and otherwise no more effective

alternative from a health care consumer’s pool of choices, the possibility of increased
consumption due to coverage evaporates.
CER is very divisive. Although a lot of federal resources have been dedicated to CER,
there are other decisions made by the federal government that demonstrate their ambivalence to
the concept. Its opponents refer to it as the rationing of health care and point to programs such as

8

Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor, Jessica C. Smith, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage
in the United States: 2010, UNITED STATES CENSUS Bureau (2011): 60-239, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf.
9
Table 1.1 – Personal Health Care (PHC) Expenditures by Source of Funds: Selected Calendar Years 1960-2011,
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/2012.html
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See, e.g., PPACA § 2705, 124 Stat. 119, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (for an example of caps and waivers on
copayments and other cost-sharing mechanisms).
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the Oregon Health Plan as an example of how this type of decisionmaking can fail. Some small
institutions continue to press on with the core ideals of CER, encouraging the idea of treating
patients based on evidence of the benefits and harms of alternative treatments, which includes
the consideration of cost. When the power of CER is harnessed effectively, one hospital’s
decision to not offer a new drug to their patient population can help influence other providers as
well. One particular area of health care worth analyzing due to its tendency of including pricy
treatments is cancer care.
After an examination of the current state of cancer care in the United States in Part I, Part
II of this piece will address the history and concept of comparative effectiveness research.
Opposition to CER will be addressed, with a particular focus on the Oregon Health Plan. In Part
III, the story of one hospital, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, will be discussed and
their decisionmaking process will be examined to demonstrate how CER can be used. The
ramifications of their decision will be evaluated as well. Part IV will introduce the reader to the
Accountable Care Organization model and demonstrate how this may in fact be an endorsement
of CER-type decisionmaking. Finally, in Part V this piece will conclude that CER is a workable
model for health care organizations despite the conflicting messages from our current
administration.
PART I: THE CURRENT STATE OF CANCER CARE: DATA THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED
In 2006, the annual cost for cancer care was $104 billion and is projected to reach $173
billion by 2020.11 Much of this rise can be attributed to the dramatic increase in cancer drugs.
One example for breast cancer chemotherapy in general showed not only a doubling in use of
11

Thomas J. Smith, M.D., and Bruce E. Hillner,, M.D., Bending the Cost Curve in Cancer Care, 364 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2060 (2011).
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chemotherapy, but also a near doubling in the average cost of treatment between 1991 and 2002
($8,288 to $15,974 in 2012 US dollars).12,13 Across all new cancer drugs, the trend is the same.
In 2002, the average cost of a new cancer drug for one month of treatment was about $4,500
(adjusted to 2012 dollars), whereas 2010 prices demonstrate a median price of $10,000.14 Figure
1 demonstrates the monthly costs of cancer drugs at the time of approval by the Food and Drug
Administration from 1965 through 2008.15 Figure 1 does contain outliers but the trend line
demonstrates the increasing costs over time. In removing the outliers (Figure 2), the trend is even
more pronounced, demonstrating a near exponential rise in the monthly cost of treatment.
Additionally, our country’s increasing costs in cancer care do not yield better results. Compared
to Canada’s $4,500/person annual cost of cancer care, the United States spends $8,100/person,
without demonstrating better results.16
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Elena B. Elkin, PhD; Peter B. Bach, MD, MAPP, Cancer’s Next Frontier: Addressing High and Increasing Costs,
303(11) JAMA 1086 (2010).
13
Dollar figures adjusted using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator, available at
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.
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Peter B. Bach, Leonard B. Saltz, Robert E. Wittes, In Cancer Care, Cost Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2012, at
A25.
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Paul B. Bach, Limits on Medicare’s Ability to Control Rising Spending on Cancer Drugs, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED.
626 (2009) (supplement to),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/suppl/10.1056/NEJMhpr0807774/suppl_file/nejm_bach_626sa1.pdf (data from the
supplement was used but graphs are original).
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Thomas J. Smith, MD, Rebecca Kirch, JD, Reducing Cost, Improving Quality Care through Individual Choices:
Taking Place at the Table, ASCO DAILY NEWS (Jun. 5, 2012),
http://chicago2012.asco.org/ASCODailyNews/CostEditorial.aspx.
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These increasing costs create a burden on the Medicare and Medicaid systems and the
insurance industry as well. Average annual health insurance premiums for family coverage have
risen 97 percent between 2002 and 2012.17 The rise in costs has had a staggering effect on the
American family as well. A comprehensive survey conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation
in 2006 explored some of the financial effects of cancer on the American household. Fifty-six
percent of those surveyed experienced an increase in the past year in the costs of drugs related to
their cancer.18 Twenty-five percent used up all or most of their savings as a result of the
financial cost of dealing with their cancer.19 Eleven percent were unable to pay for basic
necessities, like food heat or housing, as a result of the financial cost of dealing with their
cancer.20

Thirteen percent were contacted by a collection agency and 3 percent declared

bankruptcy as a result of the financial cost of dealing with their cancer.21 The numbers are even
higher in particular types of cancer. Eight percent of families dealing with lung cancer are
bankrupt due to the cost of care.22 Even patients with private insurance, where one may expect
adequate coverage, still suffer out-of-pocket costs of more than $18,000/year, and 5 percent of
those patients have out-of-pocket costs greater than $35,000/year.23
Oncologists are beginning to speak out against the pharmaceutical manufacturers
regarding the prices of anti-cancer therapies, calling the pricing unsustainable and often

17

Employer Health Benefits: 2012 Summary of Findings, The Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research &
Educational Trust (2012), http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2012/8346.pdf.
18
National Survey of Households Affected by Cancer, The USA Today/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard School
of Public Health, http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7590.pdf.
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Smith & Kirch, supra note 16.
23
Dana P. Goldman, Geoffrey F. Joyce, Grant Lawless, William H. Crown, Vincent Willey, Benefit Design And
Specialty Drug Use, 25(5) HEALTH AFF., 1319 (2006), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/25/5/1319.full.pdf.
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immoral.24 Although, little tangible evidence exists to suggest that pharmaceutical companies
are reacting to the opposition.
PART II: COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH AS
AMBIVALENCE FOR THIS TYPE OF DECISIONMAKING?

A

BODY

OF

WORK: SUPPORT

OR

One common theme throughout many pieces pointing out these daunting statistics is that
the solutions are within the hands of the oncologists themselves, including chemotherapy and
other treatment choices.25 Suggested changes in practice include the recognition that the costs of
care are driven by what the physicians do and do not do and that the need for cost-effectiveness
analysis and other limits on care must be accepted.26 This is where comparative effectiveness
research fits in nicely.
A. The Conflicting History of Comparative Effectiveness Research: Promotion and Restriction
CER has long been used in the United Kingdom where the National Institute of Clinical
Excellence uses a metric known as the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) to determine
coverage.27 A QALY accounts for such factors as the improvement in the quality of life and the
side effects a treatment may cause, which lead to such considerations as the level of pain a
person is in or their mobility.28 After determining the QALY measurement of a particular
treatment, the treatment is then evaluated to see how much it would cost per QALY, in other
words, “the cost of using the drugs to provide a year of the best quality of life available.” 29 Each
treatment is considered on an individual basis but generally a treatment will be considered cost
24

Andrew Pollack, Doctors Denounce Cancer Drug Prices of $100,000 a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2013 at B1.
Sandra M. Swain, The High Cost of a Cancer Drug: An Oncologist’s View, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2012 at A22.
26
Smith & Kirch, supra note 16.
27
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS AND COST EFFECTIVENESS: THE QALY,
http://www.nice.org.uk/newsroom/features/measuringeffectivenessandcosteffectivenesstheqaly.jsp (last visited on
Apr. 29, 2012, 11:27PM).
28
Id.
29
Id.
25
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effective, and therefore covered, if it falls within $33,000 – $50,000 per QALY.30 NICE makes
sure to point out that this is not the only measurement used to determine coverage.31
There are other suggested comparative effectiveness limitations that use the QALY
metric for suggested coverage. One study created a line for cost ineffectiveness by using the
$50,000 cost per life-year-gained as a measure.32 This number is derived from the decision to
use federal funding to pay for dialysis but reflects the 1982 cost.33 The researchers adjusted the
1982 cost to find a value of $197,000 per life-year-gained in 2007 dollars and made this the
threshold for coverage.34 The World Health Organization (WHO) has also issued their own
comparative effectiveness guidance. WHO’s guidance uses a multiple of a country’s per capita
gross domestic product (GDP): less than or equal to one times the country’s GDP is considered
very cost effective; one to three times the GDP as simply cost effective; and more than three
times the GDP as cost ineffective.35 The World Bank listed the United States’ per capita GDP at
$48,112 in 2011, making our three times threshold $144,336, or what the maximum cost per
QALY would be to label a treatment cost ineffective.36
Officially, the Institute of Medicine defines comparative effectiveness research as “… the
generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the benefits and harms of alternative
methods to prevent, diagnose, treat, and monitor a clinical condition or to improve the delivery
of care. The purpose of comparative effectiveness research is to assist consumers, clinicians,
30

John Donnelly, Comparative Effectiveness Research, HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH POLICY BRIEF,
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_28.pdf
31
Id.
32
Bruce E. Hillner, Thomas J. Smith, Efficacy Does Not Necessarily Translate to Cost Effectiveness: A Case Study
in the Challenges Associated With 21st-Century Cancer Drug Pricing, 27(13) J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2111 (2009).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Christopher J.L. Murray, David B. Evans, Arna Acharya, Rob M.P.M. Baltussen, Development of WHO
Guidelines on Generalized Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 9 HEALTH ECON. 235 (2000).
36
The World Bank, GDP per capita (current US$), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
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purchasers and policy makers to make informed decisions that will improve health care at both
the individual and population levels.”37 Historically, two big forces led to the prominence of
comparative effectiveness research. One was the focus on delivering clinical care based on
evidence, which began in the 1980s and led to the creation of the US Preventive Services
Taskforce in 1984 and the Cochrane Collaboration in 1993, followed by the evidence-based
practice centers of the Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality in 1998.38 On the other hand
was the need to make care more effective while containing costs, with the research being led by
the work of John Weinberg and Elliot Fisher on the area of spending and outcomes.39 One of
their more prominent studies demonstrated that high health care spending areas of the country do
not have better health outcomes than their counterparts in lower health care spending areas of the
country.40 In 1996, the U.S. Public Health Service suggested evaluating certain drugs and
treatments based on how many years of healthy life they produced per dollar, a measure
synonymous with CER and in 2003, George W. Bush signed the Medicare Modernization Act
into law, authorizing $50 million to be used towards cost effectiveness research of health care
treatments.41
The drive for evidence and the drive for cost containment also led to a report from the
Congressional Budget Office in 2007.42

The report included research on the comparative

37

Initial National Priorities for Comparative Effectiveness Research (2009),
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2009/ComparativeEffectivenessResearchPriorities.aspx
38
Jodi Segal, MD, MPH, Comparative Effectiveness Research: Recent Past to Present,
http://ictr.johnshopkins.edu/ictr/CER.Segal.pdf.
39
Id.
40
Gail R. Wilensky, The Policies and Politics of Creating a Comparative Clinical Effectiveness Research Center,
28(4) HEALTH AFF. W79 (2009).
41
Philip Longman, The Republican Case for Waste in Health Care, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY (Mar./Apr. 2013),
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_2013/features/the_republican_case_for_waste043314.p
hp?page=5
42
Research on the Comparative Effectiveness of Medical Treatments, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET Office (2007),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/12-18comparativeeffectiveness.pdf.
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effectiveness of medical treatments, which led to the conclusion that it is possible to constrain
health care costs both in the public programs and in the rest of the health system without
adversely affecting the health of individuals.43 The report also pointed out that geographic
differences in health care spending do not lead to higher life expectancies or measured
improvements in other health outcomes in the more health care costly regions.44 The report also
expressed concern for the fact that patients and their caregivers have limited access to
information on which treatments work best for which patients and whether the benefits of pricier
treatments warrant the added expense.45 Additionally the report posited that Medicare spending
– and perhaps all health care expenditure in the country – could be cut by 30 percent if the more
conservative practice styles used in the lowest spending one-fifth of the country could be adopted
nationwide.”46 This report advocated for further research on the comparative effectiveness of
medical treatments.
2007 and 2008 saw successive legislation encouraging further cost-effectiveness metrics.
The Children’s Health and Medicare Protection (CHAMP) Act bill was created with the purpose
of extending Medicaid benefits to low-income children and would have involved the creation of
a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Research within the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality.47 The bill never made it to the Senate.48 In the following year, the Comparative
Effectiveness Research Act (known as Baucus-Conrad for its two sponsors) was introduced with
the purpose of creating the Health Care Comparative Effectiveness Research Institute. 49,50 This

43

Id.
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Stephen Barlas, Congress Agrees on the Need for Comparativeness Research but Funding Will be a Problem,
33(10) PHARMACY AND THERAPEUTICS 569 (2008).
48
Id.
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Id.
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institute would use evidence-based research to generate treatment information on how to attain
the best clinical outcomes.51 Both bills used the term comparative clinical effectiveness research
and the latter suggested that cost-effectiveness should be explored.52
The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) of 2009 had a powerful impact
on comparative effectiveness research when it provided for $1.1 billion for patient-centered
health care research.53 This was followed in 2010 by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (PPACA), which included a section titled Patient-Centered Outcomes Research.54

In

PPACA, comparative effectiveness research is defined as “research evaluating and comparing
health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of 2 or more medical
treatments, services, and items described.”55

PPACA also established the Patient-Centered

Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI), which notably is an independent non-profit organization
and not an agency of the government.56 PCORI’s mission is to “assist patients, clinicians,
purchasers, and policymakers in making informed health decisions by advancing the quality and
relevance of evidence concerning the manner in which diseases… can effectively and
appropriately be prevented, diagnoses, treated … through research and evidence synthesis … the
dissemination of research findings…”57 In December, 2012, PCORI announced it would be

50

The Comparative Effectiveness Research Institute was the precursor to the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research
Institute (PCORI). Its name was changed due to the controversy over the inference that comparative effectiveness
research would be used. Kathryn Nix, Comparative Effectiveness Research Under Obamacare: A Slippery Slope to
Health Care Rationing, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Apr 12, 2012)
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/comparative-effectiveness-research-under-obamacare-a-slipperyslope-to-health-care-rationing
51
Id.
52
Wilensky, supra note 40.
53
RECOVERY.GOV TRACK THE MONEY, http://www.recovery.gov/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 29, 2013).
54
PPACA § 6301, 124 Stat. 119, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, www.pcori.org/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2013).
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disbursing more than $40.7 million worth of funding for its first comparative effectiveness
research projects.58
Although the history of CER suggests an inclination by our government to further this
type of research, PCORI’s focus is on patient-centered outcomes research, which does not
necessarily equate to CER. Under PPCACA, PCORI is allowed to compare the benefits of
various treatments but not compare the costs to benefits of various treatments.59 Additionally,
PPACA states that PCORI “shall not develop or employ a dollars-per-quality adjusted life
year (or similar measure that discounts the value of a life because of an individual’s
disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost effective or
recommended.”60

Quality-adjusted life years are at the center of recommendations and

guidelines by those that practice comparative effectiveness research. The QALY metric involves
quantifying the two things that most people would want from their health care: the most years of
quality of life and the least cost for those years.61 Conducting CER without the use of QALYs or
a similar metric seems undoable.
One explanation for this sharp restraint on comparative effectiveness research is the
composition of PCORI’s Board of Governors. The board consists, although not solely, of
pharmaceutical and device manufacturer executives as well as the chair and founder of Friends
of Cancer Research, a cancer research think tank and advocacy group whose funding comes from
large pharmaceutical companies.62

It would not be a stretch to say that drug and device

58

PCORI Announces Funding for First Comparative Effectiveness Research Projects,
http://www.pcori.org/2012/funding-awards/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2013).
59
Longman, supra note 41
60
Supra note 54.
61
Longman, supra note 41.
62
Id.
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manufacturers have a stake in any research that could keep their drugs and devices from
consumers by way of federal recommendations for use.
Lastly, the FDA does not consider a drug’s cost at the time of the approval decision, only
its safety and efficacy, and PPACA prohibits the use of quality-adjusted life years or other costeffectiveness metrics to be used in determining Medicare coverage or reimbursement as well.63,64
B. The Case Against Comparative Effectiveness Research
Opponents of the use of cost as a measure of a treatment’s effectiveness say that the
assertion that health care spending can be reduced by foregoing medical technologies and
treatment that add little benefit is misguided.65 They argue that in fact there is evidence that
medical innovation is associated with “greater longevity” and that comparative effectiveness
research could potentially decrease research and development through its impact on innovation
in our society.66

If forced to conduct comparative effectiveness studies prior to and as a

condition for coverage of a new medicine (note: this is currently not required), research and
development costs would soar and researchers may just decide to forego the research
altogether.67 One study found that CER has the potential to increase research and development
costs by as much as 50 percent in certain phases of the drug development process and would
reduce research and development spending by over $30 million over ten years if required to

63

HOW FDA APPROVES DRUGS AND REGULATES THEIR SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS (2012),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41983.pdf.
64
Supra note 54.
65
John Vernon, PhD, Robert Goldberg, PhD, Shorter Lives, Less Prosperity: The Impact of Comparative
Effectiveness Research on Health and Wealth, CENTER FOR MEDICINE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2009),
http://www.cmpi.org/uploads/File/CER_Paper_FINAL.pdf.
66
Id.
67
Id.
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conduct CER studies during drug development.68 Additionally, this same study estimated that
because research and development and higher life expectancy are correlated, CER could cost this
country 81 million life years and $4 trillion dollars.69 Furthermore, another recent study that
compared the effect of comparative effectiveness research on access to approved anti-cancer
treatments in Europe and the United States demonstrated that the process led to delays of over
two years and 60 percent fewer medications being made available when effectiveness reviews
were in place.70
Critics of CER point to the possibility of studies only examining a heterogeneous patient
population, meaning that the results of a study will show that one treatment is superior over
another on average.71 The treatment may work far better in one group but a study measuring
average efficacy would not demonstrate this.72 One example of this effect can be seen in a case
involving panitumumab, a drug used to treat metastatic colorectal cancer.73 In 2007, it was
rejected for coverage in Europe for being similarly as effective as its predecessor chemotherapy
that cost far less.74 A closer look at the data demonstrated that patients with a normal gene type
responded far better than patients with a particular mutation in their genes.75 A CER study that
only looked at the average benefits of those receiving the drug would have not captured this very
important difference within the patient population.76 Luckily, this particular difference was
discovered and the drug was approved for coverage the following year for those with a normal
68

Id.
Id.
70
Anne Mason, Michael Drummond, Scott Ramsey, Jonathan Campbell, Dennis Raisch, Comparison of Anticancer
Drug Coverage Decisions in the United States and United Kingdom: Does the Evidence Support the Rhetoric?,
28(20) J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3234 (2010).
71
Amitabh Chandra, Anupam B. Jena, Jonathan S. Skinner, The Pragmatist’s Guide to Comparative Effectiveness
Research, 25(2) J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2011).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
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gene.77 Supporters of CER take this concern to heart and note that knowing the average effect is
better than having no knowledge at all.78 Additionally, CER will make information far more
accessible to patients and providers alike since more expansive sets of information will allow
providers to better tailor treatment to their patients.79 The finite entry criteria for clinical trials
that the drug manufacturers require do not allow for the same sort of extensive objective analysis
across many subgroups that CER does.80 The Institute of Medicine’s own recommendation on
CER includes research involving very precise subgroups.81
Proponents of comparative effectiveness studies suggest that one key element should be
left out of the research in the short term, namely cost.82 Cost is the main factor within CER that
creates controversy and including it in future research will increase the likelihood of exposing all
such research to political vulnerability.83 Eliminating the financial factor in CER studies would
still lead to valuable conclusions that would be useful to the general health care consumer
population.84 Although, it would still leave the larger problem of an unsustainable health care
industry untouched since cost is the real problem being faced.
C. The Oregon Health Plan as Not an Example of the Failure of Comparative Effectiveness Research
The Oregon Health Plan (OHP) is often referred to as the Oregon Experiment because of
the bold steps it took to expand Medicaid coverage for Oregonians, specifically those with

77

Id.
Id.
79
Ellen-Marie Whelan, Sonia Sekhar, Better Health Through Better Information: Comparative Effectiveness
Research Will Help Deliver Better Medical Care, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Sept. 29, 2009)
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2009/09/29/6658/better-health-through-betterinformation/.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Wilensky, supra note 40.
83
Id.
84
Id.
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income below the federal poverty line.85

The Plan is often cited by opponents of cost

effectiveness metrics as a failure of this type of decisionmaking because the implementation of
rationing was unable to control costs.86 But this assertion is worthy of further investigation.
The Oregon Medicaid Priority Setting Project was initiated in 1988 by Dr. John
Kitzhaber, an emergency room physician turned state senator turned governor, and became the
cornerstone of the Oregon Health Plan.87 The Oregon Health Fund Board described the five
main goals of the plan as the following: 1) health care for the uninsured; 2) broad participation
by providers; 3) decrease cost shifting and charity care; 4) a basic benefit package of effective
services; and 5) a rational process for making decisions on how to allocate resources for health
care.88 The approach was novel; the plan would limit the services covered under the plan in
order to increase the number of people covered.89 The plan unfortunately has encountered some
impediments to fulfilling its five stated goals. The desired cost containment never came to
fruition and providers began to limit access to Medicaid patients due to a decline in
reimbursements.90 Soon after, plan beneficiaries became subject to premiums and copayments
that are in effect to this day.91
The list of covered services was created with the goal of reducing costs by eliminating
coverage for treatments that were not proven cost-effective.92 In essence, the plan sought to

85

Eric Fruits, PhD, Andrew Hillard, Laura Lewis, The Oregon Health Plan: A “Bold Experiment” That Failed,
CASCADE POLICY INSTITUTE (2010), http://cascadepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Oregon_Health_Plan__The_Bold_Experiment_That_Failed.pdf
86
Linnea Laestadius, The Oregon Health Plan – From Boom to Bust, 6 MICH. J. PUB. AFF. 1 (2009),
http://www.mjpa.umich.edu/uploads/2/9/3/2/2932559/oregonhealthplanpdf.pdf.
87
Fruits, supra note 85.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
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cover those treatments that provided the biggest “bang-for-your-buck”.93 The problem, though,
became how to make this determination and the word rationing came to the forefront of this
project.94
The covered services were to be determined by the Oregon Health Services Commission,
a group that included providers and consumers or purchasers of health care services.95 This list
would prioritize services deemed cost-effective and would exclude any service or treatment
determined to be cost-ineffective.96 Dr. Kitzhaber viewed this particular aspect of the program
as a way to impact physician decisionmaking, which, according to him, controls 70 percent of
the health care budget

through the effects of their decisions to hospitalize (or not), what

procedure to perform, and what drugs to prescribe.97 The Commission first created a list of 709
diagnoses and their treatments, which were referred to as “condition/treatment pairs”.98 The list
was intended to be purely objective and to be based on a mathematical formula that combined
clinical data and outcomes research.99 Condition/treatment pairs would be moved up or down
the list based on this cost-benefit formulary or onto the list in the case of new treatments and
procedures.100

Any additional condition/treatment pairs were to be added based on this

formula.101 Several condition/treatment prioritization lists were proposed and rejected.102 The
list that was eventually put into practice used a ranking system that was not purely based on cost-
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effectiveness, as originally planned but, but also included many metrics based on subjective
judgment.103 The Commission’s instructions to the clinical advisory panels conducting outcomes
research even included instructions such as the following: “It is understood that some outcome
data may be subjective in nature.

A disease may be bimodal with significantly different

outcomes occurring dependent on age of onset or vary according to the extent of the disease at
the time of presentation (stage). If this is the case… please think of the average patient that
presents with this condition not the extremes.”104 Additionally, the lack of sound scientific
studies that considered the costs and benefits of various treatments was concerning to many
participating providers because it was not known how exactly the Commission was to create a
list based on objective factors.105 In fact, the Commission encouraged providers to continue to
make “medical decisions … based on their best clinical judgment,” which led to physicians
exercising their judgment and deciding to pursue treatments and services that were not covered
by the Plan.106 Essentially, the Commission was relying on these panels to provide outcomes
information based on their clinical judgment – a subjective approach – and not on the formulaic
and objective approach that was intended. Cost-effectiveness yielded to other factors, including
political pressures, in determining coverage and was essentially abandoned.107
The list was not and is not utilized as envisioned. Plan participants receive many services
and treatments that were meant to be excluded, whether it is through loopholes in the plan or
physicians diagnosing patients with covered diagnoses, when in fact an “uncovered” diagnosis
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may be more appropriate.108 The program overall has not demonstrated promising results. The
percentage of uninsured Oregonians is not significantly different than the percentage of
uninsured in the rest of the country.109 (See Figure 3110). Additionally, Oregon’s Medicaid
expenditures have tracked the country’s Medicaid expenditures, demonstrating that the plan has
not led to the hoped for decrease in spending.111 (See Figure 4112). Regardless of one’s opinion
of why the Oregon Health Plan may be a failure or has not met its goals, one thing is clear –
neither rationing nor the cost-effectiveness determination for coverage was what led to the lack
of success of the great Oregon Experiment.

Furthermore, one of the Plan’s uses of cost

effectiveness that remains in place has proven quite successful. The Plan’s formulary members
compare drugs to create a list of preferred and covered drugs under the plan. 113 A drug is
covered if it is determined to be “as effective as any other drug in the class but more costeffective.”114 This appears to be the essence of what makes comparative effectiveness research
so valuable.

The objective determinations based on effectiveness and outcomes research

flourish, whereas subjective determinations do not.
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Figure 3

Figure 4

D. Findings
The wavering legislation between congressional proposals pushing for comparative clinical
effectiveness research and an institute that is forbidden from using comparative effectiveness metrics
20

suggests a deep ambivalence towards CER by our government.115 PCORI almost seems like a
consolation prize to proponents of CER. There are valid arguments against the use of CER on the
front end of research, where the effect could lead to an increase in research and development costs.116
The arguments against CER on the back-end, where the decisions of what to offer patients are made,
do not seem as strong. As an example, the OHP is often cited as an example of the failure of rationing
but a closer look demonstrated that in fact the comparative effectiveness metrics were not carried out
as intended. Comparative effectiveness research has not been properly implemented in this country
by the government so perhaps it should be implemented voluntarily by the private sector. Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center is one example of a private institution that made a decision based on
the evidence available to them, including cost.
PART II: MEMORIAL SLOAN-KETTERING
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH

AS AN

EXAMPLE

OF

PRIVATE SECTOR USE

OF

The vehicle was the New York Times. The words were those of three Memorial SloanKettering Cancer Center (MSKCC) oncologists. Dr. Peter Bach, Dr. Leonard Saltz, and Dr.
Robert Wittes made the bold decision to author an op-ed piece titled In Cancer Care Cost Matters
that appeared in the October 14, 2012, issue of the New York Times. 117 The op-ed detailed
MSKCC’s decision to exclude Zaltrap® (ziv-aflibercept) from the hospital’s formulary.118 The
Food and Drug Administration had recently approved Zaltrap (manufactured by Sanofi-Aventis)
on August 3, 2012, for use in combination with chemotherapy to treat metastatic colorectal
cancer.119

The MSKCC physicians’ decisionmaking followed a comparative effectiveness
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research framework by using such factors as overall survival benefit, the side effect profile,
patient convenience, and the fairly controversial factor of cost.120,121
A. The Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center Decision122
The MSKCC physicians wanted Zaltrap to work. The Phase I trials were done at
MSKCC and unfortunately all evidence showed that the drug in fact did not work as well as the
investigators wanted it to. It is a common misconception that Phase I trials do not evaluate
efficacy and simply determine safety dosage. The modern and sensible approach is to look for
activity in a Phase I trial and if it is not seen, it is highly unlikely that there will be activity in a
Phase II trial of the same drug, and therefore a Phase II trial does not pose good costeffectiveness. During Zaltrap’s research and development process, there was another agent
known as Avastin that had been approved by the FDA in 2004 for use in patients with metastatic
colorectal cancer. MSKCC has been using Avastin since its approval.
As Chair of MSKCC’s Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee, Dr. Saltz began to
prepare the necessary paperwork for adding the newly approved Zaltrap to the hospital’s
formulary. Although not terribly excited about the drug’s prospects, the hospital had never not
placed a newly FDA-approved drug on the formulary. Dr. Saltz had every reason to believe it
would be approved. What followed was an email from a pharmacy administrator that changed
the course of this drug, at least within MSKCC. The administrator informed Dr. Saltz that
Zaltrap had been priced at over $11,000 on average for a month of treatment, more than twice
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the price of the standard of care, Avastin, which costs about $5,000 a month.

Dr. Saltz

approached the entire gastrointestinal oncology service with one simple question – knowing the
data and the newly found price, could anyone envision using the drug? Nobody could. The next
step was to approach the Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee with a new message and plenty
of data.
“Sanofi-Aventis chose to pretend that Avastin didn’t exist.” MSKCC did everything but
that and drew upon the similarities between Zaltrap and Avastin when the Pharmacy and
Therapeutics Committee met to discuss Zaltrap. Seen in Figures 5 and 6 are the Overall Survival
curves for Zaltrap (Figure 5) and Avastin (Figure 6).123 The survival curves were virtually
identical. Both were compared to the same chemotherapy regimen and both showed an equal
overall survival benefit of 1.4 months. This was not entirely surprising since both drugs also
work along the same molecular pathway. They are both Vascular Endothelial Growth Factor
(VEGF) inhibitors.124 Both drugs are also used in the same setting – second-line colorectal
indication – meaning that the VEGF inhibitors are used after frontline chemotherapy fails in
patients with metastatic colorectal cancer. The study that Sanofi-Aventis used when filing for
FDA approval became commonly known as the VELOUR trial. Often trials that follow similar
molecular pathways require that patients have been treated with the similar drug and that the
drug have failed prior to moving on to the new treatment so that the investigators have an idea of
the similarity in response rates in what may be, especially in this case, very similar treatments.
The study design in this case did not require that patients have frontline Avastin, or another
VEGF inhibitor, and about half were naïve to VEGF inhibitors. The side effects profiles of the
123
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drugs were also incredibly similar and perhaps even worse in Zaltrap. Both were required to
carry black box warnings indicating that the FDA felt that the drugs carried a significant risk of
serious adverse events.

The boxed warnings were for gastrointestinal perforation and

hemorrhaging. Additionally, Avastin was also slightly more convenient for patients because it
takes less time to administer than Zaltrap.125
In addition to the clinical data, the MSKCC physicians looked to clinical practice
guidelines. The National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) guidelines suggest that
Zaltrap is no better than Avastin in the second-line setting for metastatic colorectal cancer.126
Furthermore, the NCCN guidelines state that besides being essentially equivalent, they point out
that there are no data to suggest that switching a patient to Zaltrap after Avastin has failed, or
vice versa, would provide any benefit to the patient.127
The one stark difference between Zaltrap and Avastin lay in the financial characteristics
of each drug. One month of Avastin treatment costs about $5,000, while a month of Zaltrap
treatment costs over $11,000.128 Using comparative effectiveness metrics, the cost of Zaltrap for
one year of life-gained is $585,200.129 Regardless of one’s methodology to determine costeffectiveness, Zaltrap appeared clearly cost ineffective as compared to what was already
available, so MSKCC decided to make it unavailable to its patient population.130
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Within a week, the president of the American Society of Clinical Oncology had written a
letter to the New York Times editor which was published on October 19, 2012.131 Dr. Swain
spoke encouragingly of MSKCC’s decision and seemingly endorsed their action by stating it
“reflect[ed] a much-needed willingness to address the elephant in the room: unsustainable costs
in cancer care.”132 The CEO of Sanofi-Aventis, Christoper Viebacher, rebuffed the new and
controversial concerns that the drug was not appropriately priced and claimed that it was
competitively priced to the standard of care – Avastin – based on comparable dosing.133 He went
on to say that “the spirit of the op-ed [was] something [he] would fully subscribe to” and that
“we really need to make sure that there is complete access with enough incentive for
research.”134
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Figure 5

Figure 6
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B. The Compromising Financial Compromise
Less than two weeks later, Sanofi-Aventis announced that it was reducing the price of
Zaltrap due to “market resistance.”135 Although, there would be no change in Zaltrap’s official
price, Sanofi-Aventis would begin to offer an approximately fifty-percent discount, creating a
potentially problematic compromise.136 Sanofi-Aventis had overtly admitted to setting the price
of the drug as what they saw their competition –Genentech’s Avastin – and not on how valuable
the drug could be to patients or how well it worked in the clinical trials.137 Sanofi-Aventis had
conducted a marketing study of seventy oncologists which showed that 55 percent of them used
Avastin at a dose of 10mg/kg versus the 5mg.kg.138 Notably, the composition of their sample
group consisted mostly of private practitioners.139 It could be said that the sample group was
comprised of physicians who have a financial incentive to use a higher dose because they are
paid by the number of milligrams of drug that they use. Although it is not illegal to use 10mg/kg
in colorectal cancer patients, and in fact, in every other cancer that Avastin is used for,
oncologists use the 10mg/kg dose.140 Both doses are listed for use on the Avastin label, but the
lower dose of Avastin produces equivalent results to its 10mg/kg counterpart and offers the
patient a lower risk of side effects.141

The MSKCC oncologists, and to the best of their

knowledge, their colleagues at other academic institutions, all use the 5mg/kg dose of Avastin.142
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In addition, all relevant treatment guidelines recommend the 5mg/kg dose.143 So when SanofiAventis pegged their price for Zaltrap to the 10mg/kg dose of Avastin, it was misguided and this
led to a pricing that was essentially twice that of Avastin.
The response came in the form of a 50 percent discount, which can be thought of as a
coupon that the hospital or physician would use when purchasing Zaltrap.144 There was nothing
in writing and therefore what has not changed is the official price of the drug as reported to the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).145 Changing the published price to 50
percent of the listed price would require that an active step be taken with CMS, which as of now
has not been done.146 Additionally, any reimbursement rates are based on the price set by
Sanofi-Aventis.147 What is potentially very problematic is that if the Medicare reimbursement
rates are not adjusted, a scenario would exist where prescribing physicians stand to gain
financially from using Zaltrap.148
Most academic institutions do not accept the sort of discount that Sanofi-Aventis created,
MSKCC included, due to potential incentives in prescribing the drug.149 A look at Medicare
reimbursement practices, for example, demonstrates how a 50 percent discount could create this
incentive. A drug’s wholesale acquisition cost (WAC) is the manufacturer’s published price to
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wholesale buyers.150 Medicare’s reimbursement price is based on an average WAC for the first
two quarters following the drug’s launch in combination with the first two quarters’ average
sales price of the drug, plus six percent.151 A drug’s average sales price (ASP) is defined as the
manufacturer’s sales of a drug to all purchasers in a calendar quarter divided by the total number
of units of the drug sold by the manufacturer in that same quarter, excluding Medicaid rebates
and other discounts.152 Drugs are reimbursed at 80 percent of 106 percent of the Average Sales
Price.153 There would be a potential cost incentive to a doctor to prescribe the drug because it
would be sold to them at Sanofi-Aventis’ 50 percent discount off WAC but then it would be
reimbursed at the 80 percent rate and charged at the wholesale rate to the patients, plus 6
percent.154 Figure 7 demonstrates the flow of funds for a fictional drug priced at $1,000 that a
provider would purchase using a 50 percent type discount, similar to the Zaltrap discount.155 The
drug’s WAC in the first quarter would be $1,000 (pre-discount). The drug’s WAC in the second
quarter would be $500 (post-50 percent discount). The weighted average sales price based on
the first two quarters to Medicare beneficiaries would be $750. The providers pay out $500 to
acquire the drug but take in $750 ($600 from Medicare and $150 from the patient). By statute,
Medicare does not possess the ability to immediately bargain for the lower price. 156 On the other
hand, insurance companies may be able to, which could lead to copayment savings for those
patients insured by private insurance.157

These renegotiations may lead to decreasing any
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possible incentive to treat with this pricey, yet discounted, drug. The unresolved issue regarding
Medicare beneficiaries would remain though.
Figure 7

C. Findings and Recommendations
This decision to exclude Zaltrap from MSKCC’s formulary should be uncontroversial
and to date, only Sanofi-Aventis has resisted in praising the decision. Avastin was the readily
available, widely used, cheaper, and equally effective alternative.

The struggle comes in

spreading this type of decisionmaking to other hospitals. Perhaps this was too easy and too
perfect of a decision to make. Zaltrap and Avastin mirrored each other with the exception of
their cost. Other treatment counterparts do not measure so equally, making the decision much
more difficult. At least one other institution, US Oncology, has publicly stated that they also
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excluded Zaltrap from their formulary.158 On the other hand, Ohio State included Zaltrap in its
formulary but they had no plans to offer the treatment until the discount was announced.159
Perhaps the answer is in the formulary (pharmacy and therapeutics) committee itself.
Formulary committee guidelines state that “a formulary system is the ongoing process through
which a health care organization establishes policies regarding the use of drugs, therapies, and
drug-related products and identifies those that are most medically appropriate and cost-effective
to best service the health interests of a given patient population.”160 The cost-effectiveness
aspect of formulary inclusion or exclusion does not seem to be taking place if MSKCC’s
decision was considered so bold and groundbreaking. Formulary guidelines also state that
formulary decisions should be based on evidence-based evaluation, which is defined as “as
systematic approach to the evaluation of biomedical literature and application to clinical practice
and should be applied to formulary decisionmaking for medication product selection.”161
Evidence-based decisionmaking with the consideration of cost is at the core of CER. The
problem may lie in the final gatekeepers to the pricier drugs – the formulary committee – and the
possibility that they are not following their own guidelines.
PART IV: ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH

AS AN

INDIRECT PROMOTION

OF
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Elliott Fisher, the Director of the Center for Health Policy Research at Dartmouth
Medical School, first coined the term Accountable Care Organization (ACO) in 2006.162 ACOs
were drafted into three healthcare reform bills in 2009 but the pinnacle came in 2010 when the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) included the concept in its final
legislation.163 Appearing in Section 3022, PPACA authorizes the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services to “establish a shared savings program … that promotes accountability for a
patient population and coordinates items and services under parts A and B, and encourages
investment in infrastructure and redesigned care processes for high quality and efficient delivery
service.”164 The current Medicare payment method is quite fragmented, paying hospitals and
their physicians separately and paying physicians separate fees for the same patients depending
on the diagnosis and treatment received (commonly known as fee-for-service).165

This

fragmented method promotes anything but coordination and accountability. 166 An ACO would
not do away with the fee-for-service method of payment but would instead create financial
incentives through bonuses when providers keep costs low.167 The providers and hospitals
would also have to meet certain quality benchmarks that focus on preventative measures and
managing chronic conditions.168 This is one way that ACOs are held accountable, a key measure
of their success.

There are process, outcome, and efficiency measurements.

A process

measurement looks at whether a particular service was provided to a patient consistent with
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clinical guidelines.169 An outcome measurement evaluates how well patients are doing after
receiving health care services.170

An efficiency measurement assesses the cost of care as

compared to its quality, i.e., did a provider use a costlier treatment when a less costly alternative
was available and would have worked just as well.171
Determining how an incentive payment for meeting quality benchmarks and lowering
costs involves evaluating four factors: the benchmark against which expenditures will be
compared, the minimum savings rate, the sharing or loss rate, and how the benchmark will be
updated.172

Determining the comparator benchmark focuses on establishing the patient

population that will be served, whether there will be one or multiple benchmarks based on
different patient groups, and how the benchmarks will be adjusted.173 The minimum savings or
loss rate is the percentage above which the ACO would share in savings or pay back any
losses.174 This rate accounts for fluctuations in expenditures in case they occur.175 CMS has set
the minimum rate at 2 percent, meaning if an ACO’s rate is set at 2 percent but their
expenditures happen to increase by 4 percent in a given year, they would be penalized because
they went above the allowable 2 percent loss.176 Staying within that 2 percent would lead to no
penalty.177 The sharing or loss rate is the rate that the ACO will receive as an incentive
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payment.178 A Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) ACO will use a 50 percent sharing
rate (even higher for those ACOs that assume greater risk).179 The rate is determined by a
measure known as a quality score.180 A quality score takes into account certain factors like
patient/caregiver experience, preventative health, and implementation of electronic health
records.181 For example, an ACO that generates $100,000 in savings over the minimum savings
rate and receives a perfect quality score of 100 percent would receive $50,000 as an incentive
payment (50% sharing rate x 100% quality score x $100,000).182 A lower quality score, for
example 75 percent, would lead to a lower incentive payment (50% sharing rate x 75% quality
score x $100,000 = $37,500 incentive payment).183 Lastly, an ACO needs to determine when
and how its benchmark will be updated.184
The purpose of ironing out the details of an ACO is to demonstrate that its elements very
closely align with those of CER. Some have opined that if CER results are to influence the
choices of physicians and their patients, the results must be accompanied by economic
incentives.185 It appears that ACOs, through their financial motivations for cost-saving, are this
very incentive that has been spoken of. Despite PPACA’s prohibition on PCORI using QALYs
and similar metrics, an argument can be made that the law may have indirectly and inadvertently
encouraged the consideration of cost during the treatment determination process. 186 An ACO
cannot save money and thereby partake in the financial incentives without including cost in the
178
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treatment determination process. It should be noted that cost cannot be the only factor when
providers undergo treatment decisionmaking since their quality scores and other benchmarks are
based on patient health and satisfaction outcomes. CER also is not entirely based on cost,
although its opponents would have you believe this.187 CER’s goal is to generate data that
compares the benefits of various treatments, which will undoubtedly include cost, since a patient
will benefit from saving money. ACO providers will exclude pricier and no more effective
treatments because they will be incentivized to do so, whether it is through meeting their
efficiency measurement benchmarks or ensuring that they maintain an adequate share or loss
ratio that will lead to savings.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
In returning to the concept of the moral hazard, CER appears to fit in quite nicely as the
vehicle to eliminating the concept of over-consumption by the insured. The OHP was an attempt
at removing the costlier, less-effective options from the table but faltered due to outside
pressures. The OHP should not be viewed as a failure of CER decisionmaking but as a learning
lesson. Their objective formula for inclusion or exclusion to the list does not seem so passé
when there is research pointing to the ability of mathematical models to out-perform doctors in
predicting patient outcomes.188
Memorial Sloan-Kettering took a giant leap at removing an option from the table through
their decision to exclude the pricey Zaltrap from their formulary. Their publication of this
decision has inspired other oncologists to stand up to big pharmaceutical manufacturers and their
187
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pricing practices but it is unclear how the pharmaceutical companies will respond.189 Before
waiting for the companies to respond, one area worth evaluating are the practices of formulary
committees, whose very guidelines dictate the use of cost as an inclusion/exclusion criteria, but
this does not seem to be put into practice.
The ramifications of a MSKCC-type decision are still unclear. MSKCC has thus far
received only positive feedback regarding their decision but long term legal consequences are
still unclear. The pharmaceutical companies may be the party that should be concerned. After a
decision to exclude a pricey drug, it would seem that pricing a drug based on your competition
does not seem to be the smart move. They are now on notice that not everyone will put up with
their decisions. A company’s loyalty is to its shareholders bottom line may lead them to avoid
CER studies at the front-end of their research development process but it should also lead to
smarter marketing studies.

Could a flawed marketing study, like the one that led to the

misguided Zaltrap pricing create actionable grounds for shareholders against the company? At
least some consider Zaltrap to be one of the worst drug launches of all time.190 The resistance to
egregious drug-pricing is building and for the time being, the power seems to be on the side of
the private sector’s use of comparative effectiveness research to do away with the expensive
drugs if the pharmaceutical companies refuse to do so.
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